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THE LONG ARM OF FEDERAL COURTS: DOMESTIC
JURISDICTION ON THE HIGH SEAS
The southeastern coast of the United States is a convenient target for
narcotics smuggling activity.1 The Coast Guard frequently apprehends cit-
izens of foreign nations, on the high seas, attempting to smuggle controlled
substances into the United States in violation of federal statutes. 2 Defen-
dants have raised the defense that the Convention on the High Seas,3 a
treaty giving every nation exclusive control over its own ships on the high
seas, prohibits a United States court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over
aliens arrested outside United States waters.' In the United States, a de-
fendant may not claim an unlawful arrest as a defense to the jurisdiction
of a domestic court.' This principle does not apply, however, where a treaty
Most of the criminal prosecutions for smuggling narcotics into the United States have
come before the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit has consistently held that the United States
has jurisdiction to arrest and prosecute aliens who have violated domestic law, even though
these aliens are apprehended in waters which are not under United States control. See United
States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258, 1265 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862,
873 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Cortes, 588 F.2d 106, 108-09 (5th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1256-57 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d
975, 981 (5th Cir. 1975).
2 See United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 867 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Wil-
liams, 589 F.2d 210, 212 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Cortes, 588 F.2d 106, 108 (5th Cir.
1979); United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1256 (5th Cir. 1978); 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846,
952, 963 (1976); notes 29, 58 infra.
Opened for signature April 29, 1958, [1962] 13 U.S.T. 2313, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450
U.N.T.S. 82, [hereinafter cited as Convention on the High Seas.]
See United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 870 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Cadena,
585 F.2d 1252, 1260 (5th Cir. 1978). United States territorial waters include internal waters,
the territorial sea, and the contiguous zone. See Convention on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone, opened for signature April 29, 1958, [1964] 15 U.S.T. 1607, T.I.A.S. No.
5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205. The territorial sea is a belt of water, three miles in breadth, adjacent
to the coast. Id. art. 1, 1; see United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 879 (5th Cir. 1979). The
contiguous zone adjoins the territorial sea, and extends up to twelve miles from the landward
boundary of the territorial sea. [1964] 15 U.S.T. 1607, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205,
art. 24, 1-2. The United States may regulate its territorial sea and contiguous zone to the
extent necessary to enforce domestic customs, fiscal, immigration and santiary regulations.
Id. art. 24, 1. The high seas include all open waters beyond the contiguous zone. Convention
on the High Seas, supra note 3, art. 1.
5 Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886). In
Ker, the defendant was kidnapped from Peru and brought to Illinois to be tried on criminal
charges. 119 U.S. at 437-38 (1886). Challenging the court's jurisdiction over his person, the
defendant alleged that his forcible arrest violated due process of law. Id. at 439. The Court
held that the fourteenth amendment's due process guarantee was satisfied when the defen-
dant was apprised of the charges against him and given a fair trial. Id. at 440. The Constitu-
tion does not restrict the means by which a court may obtain personal jurisdiction over an
indicted defendant. Id.; see Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952). Thus, the indicted
defendant's claim of unlawful arrest has no constitutional foundation and cannot defeat
personal jurisdiction. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436,
440 (1886). The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly held that aliens, arrested on the high seas for
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which imposes territorial limitations on United States jurisdiction is oper-
ative as domestic law, since the treaty then overrides existing domestic law
which conflicts with its provisions.'
A self-executing treaty becomes domestic law immediately upon ratifi-
cation.7 A treaty which requires congressional legislation to effectuate
treaty provisions is not self-executing and does not become domestic law
upon ratification.' The provisions of a non-self-executing treaty cannot be
enforced in United States courts until Congress enacts implementing legis-
lation.' If a treaty is not expressly self-executing or non-self-executing on
its face, courts traditionally look to the intent of its drafters and its legisla-
tive history to decide whether the treaty is operative as domestic law.,
Defendants arrested on the high seas must therefore prove that the Con-
vention is self-executing to escape the jurisdiction of United States
courts."
violation of federal statutes regulating controlled substances, cannot defeat personal jurisdic-
tion by claiming that their presence before the court was unlawfully secured. United States
v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 873 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1259
(5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975, 985-86 (5th Cir. 1975); accord, United
States v. Keller, 451 F. Supp. 631, 634 (D.P.R. 1978).
1 Article VI of the United States Constitution declares that all properly made and rati-
fied treaties become the supreme law of the land. U.S. CoNST. art. VI, § 2, cl. 2. An executed
or self-executing treaty is operative as domestic law. See text accompanying note 7 infra.
Where an executed or self-executing treaty is inconsistent with an existing federal statute,
and cannot be construed so as to give effect to both, the treaty will supercede the federal
legislation. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 118-19 (1932); Chae Chan Ping v. United
States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1888); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884).
Foster v. Nielson, 27 U.S. 108, 121 (1829); Saipan v. United States Dep't of Interior,
502 F.2d 90, 100-01 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 421 U.S. 911 (1975) (Trask, J., concurring);
Aerovias Interamericanas de Panama v. Board of County Comm'rs., 197 F. Supp. 230, 245
(S.D. Fla. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 307 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1962); Comment, Criteria for
Self-Executing Treaties, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 238, 239 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Criteria for
Self-Executing Treaties]. A self-executing treaty itself provides the means for its administra-
tion and enforcement, so that domestic courts are competent to enforce treaty provisions
without legislative aid. 27 U.S. at 121 (1829). An executed treaty is a non-self-executing treaty
that has been legislatively implemented. See text accompanying notes 8-9 infra.
I In Ortman v. Stanray Corp., 371 F.2d 154 (7th Cir. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 431
F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1971), the Seventh Circuit held that ratification of a non-self-executing
multilateral treaty, without subsequent legislative implementation, was insufficient to make
the treaty enforceable federal law. Id. at 157; see Aerovias Interamericanas v. Bd. of County
Comm'rs, 197 F. Supp. 230, 245 (S.D. Fla. 1961); Note, The Domestic Legal Effect of Declara-
tions That Treaty Provisions Are Not Self-Executing, 57 Tax. L. Rav. 233, 236-37 (1979).
1 Saipan v. United States Dep't of Interior, 502 F.2d 90,'101 (9th Cir. 1974) (Trask, J.,
concurring); Aerovias Interamericanas v. Board of County Comm'rs, 197 F. Supp. 230, 245
(S.D. Fla. 1961); Comment, Self-Executing Treaties and the Human Rights Provisions of the
United Nations Charter: A Separation of Powers Problem, 25 BusALo L. Rav. 773, 773 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Self-Executing Treaties].
I0 See Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Saipan v. United States
Dep't of Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 97 (9th Cir. 1974); Aerovias Interamericanas v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 197 F. Supp. 230, 248 (S.D. Fla. 1961); Criteria for Self-Executing Treaties, supra
note 7, at 240-43.
11 See notes 6 & 7 supra; text accompanying note 8 supra.
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The Convention was one of four treaties signed by the United States
at Geneva in 1958.12 President Eisenhower submitted the four treaties and
an "Optional Protocol"'3 to the Senate for ratification.1' The Optional
Protocol gave the International Court of Justice compulsory jurisdiction
over all disputes involving the interpretation or application of the treat-
ies.' 5 After a public hearing before the Senate Committee.on Foreign Rela-
tions, the Senate ratified the treaties without further debate." The Senate
did not, however, ratify the Optional Protocol."
The Convention is founded on the principle of freedom of the seas and
the proposition that every nation has a right to sail its ships on the high
seas free froln foreign interference." Coastal and noncoastal states are free
to navigate on the high seas, and no state may subject any part of those
waters to its sovereignty. 9 A ship is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of
the state whose flag it flies while on the high seas.? That state has sole
1, On April 29, 1958, the United States signed the Convention on the High Seas, supra
note 3; the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, [1964] 15 U.S.T.
1607, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205; the Convention on -Fishing and Conservation of
the Living Resources of the High Seas, [1960] 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S.
285; and the Convention on the Continental Shelf, [1964] 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578,
499 U.N.T.S. 311. These four treaties are collectively known as the "Law of the Sea Conven-
tions." See 106 CONG. REc. 11189 (1960).
11 Optional Protocol of Signature Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes
Arising Out of the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature April 29,
1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 169. [hereinafter cited as Optional Protocol].
, 106 CONG. REc. 11187 (1960) (remarks of Sen. Mansfield).
,1 Optional Protocol, supra note 13, art. 1. The Optional Protocol exempts certain articles
in the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas,
[1960] 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285, from the compulsory jurisdiction
of the International Court. Optional Protocol, supra note 13, art. 2; see note 64 infra.
" 106 CONG. REc. 11192 (1960) (remarks of Sen. Mansfield). The Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations heard debate on the Conventions on January 20, 1960. See generally Con-
ventions on the Law of the Sea: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations United
States Senate, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960); [hereinafter cited as SENTE HEAM GS]. On April
5, 1960 the Committee voted unanimously to report the conventions favorably to the Senate.
106 CoNG. REc. 11192 (1960). The Senate ratified the four Law of the Sea Conventions on
May 26, 1960. Id. at 11195-96.
'7 Id. at 11193.
1 See Convention on the High Seas, supra note 3, art. 2; 106 CONG. REc. 11190 (1960).
" Convention on the High Seas, supra note 3, art. 2. The Convention declares that every
state must exercise its right to freedom of the high seas with "reasonable regard" for the
interests of other states. Id.; see 106 CONG. REc. 11190 (1960).
" Convention on the High Seas, supra note 3, art. 6. The Convention's principle of
exclusive jurisdiction is subject to two limited exceptions. A warship may board and search
a foreign merchant vessel when there is reason to suspect that the vessel is engaged in piracy
or slave trade, or is of the same nationality as the warship. Id. art. 22, 1(a), (b), (c). Coast
Guard vessels are "warships." See United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258, 1267 (5th Cir.
1979); Convention on the High Seas, supra note 3, art. 8, 2. In addition, when a coastal state's
law enforcement officers reasonably believe that a foreign ship discovered within territorial
waters has violated domestic law, they may commence "hot pursuit" of the vessel and con-
tinue the chase into the high seas. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 3, art. 23, 1; see
589 F.2d at 872; note 4 supra.
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authority to promulgate regulations to control its vessels .2 The Convention
neither states that its provisions are to be self-executing, nor that they
must be affirmatively implemented to b~come effective domestic law of a
ratifying state. 2 Because the treaty failed to provide specifically for en-
forcement of its terms, the only court deciding the question of self-
execution had difficulty determining whether the Convention was domes-
tic law.Y
In United States v. Postal" the Fifth Circuit addressed the issue
whether the Convention was self-executing. The court found that extrinsic
evidence was insufficient to support a self-executing interpretation of the
Convention, and therefore rejected defendants' assertion that the treaty
was effective as domestic law.n In Postal, the Coast Guard encountered a
foreign ship on the high seas off the Florida coast.2' The ship displayed no
z See 106 CONG. REC. 11190 (1960).
2 See Convention on the High Seas, supra note 3, art. 31-34. United States courts
normally hold an international agreement to which the United States is a party to be self-
executing only when the writing indicates that its provisions will become effective as domestic
law upon ratification. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 154(2) (1962) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS].
2 In both United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 870 (5th Cir. 1979), and United States
v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1260 (5th Cir. 1978), the defendants asserted an alleged breach of
the Convention as a defense to the Fifth Circuit's jurisdiction. However, the court decided
the issue of self-execution only in Postal. See text accompanying notes 51-62 infra. In Cadena,
an informant's tip and subsequent undercover investigation led the Coast Guard to a ship
known to be carrying marijuana for importation into the United States. 585 F.2d 1252, 1256
(5th Cir. 1978). The Coast Guard forcibly stopped and boarded the vessel, 200 miles from
the Florida coast, and discovered fifty-four tons of marijuana in the hold. Id. the defendants
were convicted of conspiracy to import and distribute a controlled substance in the United
States, in violation of federal law. Id.; see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 952 (1976).
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, defendants alleged that, since none of the Convention's
exceptions to the exclusive jurisdiction requirement of Article 6 applied to their case, see note
20 supra, the Coast Guard's boarding on the high seas constituted a breach of the treaty. Brief
for Appellants at 21, United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir. 1978). However, the
appellants merely asserted that the Convention was "the controlling law," and did not argue
the issue of self-execution. See id. The Fifth Circuit found statutory authorization for the
boarding and held that the existence of probable cause and exigent circumstances justified
the warrantless search under the fourth amendment. 585 F.2d at 1259, 1263. The court found
that defendants lacked standing to assert the treaty as a defense to United States jurisdiction,
because neither of the nations having jurisdiction over the defendants and the vessel were
parties to the Convention. Id. at 1260-61; see notes 65-66 infra.
24 589 F.2d at 862.
Id. at 884.
"Id. at 866. The Coast Guard initially boarded the foreign vessel within United States
territorial waters to verify its nationality and destintion. Id. Federal statutes authorize the
Coast Guard to board vessels which are within territorial waters or otherwise subject to
United States jurisdiction, in order to examine the ship's papers and conduct a search. 14
U.S.C. § 89 (a) (1976); 19 U.S.C. § 1581 (1976); 19 C.F.R. § 162.3 (1979). On the first boarding
the Coast Guard conducted no search, although defendant Postal offered an unexpected bribe
to a Coast Guard officer. 589 F.2d at 866. Immediately following the first boarding, the vessel
changed course and headed for the high seas. Id. at 867 Believing the ship to be transporting
contraband, the Coast Guard approached a second time and compelled it to stand by for
boarding. Id.
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flag and exhibited no name or home port.Y The Coast Guard boarded the
ship and discovered 8,000 pounds of marijuana on board.2 Defendants
were convicted of conspiring to possess marijuana with intent to distribute
and conspiring to import marijuana into the United States.29
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the defendants contended that the
boarding and search of their vessel violated the Convention and that,
because of the treaty violation, a United States court could not assert
jurisdiction over them.2 The government disagreed with the defendants,
maintaining that the court had jurisdiction to prosecute defendants de-
spite a treaty violation because the Convention was not enforceable as
domestic law.3' The Fifth Circuit agreed with the government, holding that
violation of the non-self-executing Convention did not divest the court of
personal jurisdiction."2
To defeat United States jurisdiction, an alien defendant must show
that the Coast Guard breached a treaty ratified by the Senate and that
the treaty was either executed or self-executing.s To ascertain whether the
Convention was self-executing, the Fifth Circuit first looked to the lan-
guage of the treaty.34 Although Article 6, prohibiting any state from exer-
cising jurisdiction over foreign vessels on the high seas, appeared to be self-
executing, the court examined the Convention as a whole to determine
whether the United States intended to deprive itself of jurisdiction." The
court did not decide whether the Convention was self-executing on its
face. 6 Instead the court relied on extrinsic evidence of Senate intent, find-
ing that the Senate meant to ratify the treaty without making it binding
as domestic law. 7 The Postal court found abundant evidence to support a
conclusion that the United States did not intend to relinquish jurisdiction
" 589 F.2d at 866.
n The second boarding took place outside territorial waters, when the foreign ship was
16.3 miles from the United States coastline. Id. The ship was under continuous surveillance
between the first and second boardings. Id. However, the "hot pursuit" exception did not
justify the second boarding, since the Coast Guard had not given the requisite stop signal
within territorial waters before continuing the chase into the high seas. Id. at 872; see Conven-
tion on the High Seas, supra note 3, art. 23, 3.
" 589 F.2d at 865. Persons who knowingly or intentionally possess a controlled substance
with intent to manufacture, distribute or dispense, may be imprisoned, fined, or both. 21
U.S.C. § 846 (1976). Persons who conspire to unlawfully import controlled substances into
the United States are similarly punishable. 21 U.S.C. § 963 (1976).
3 589 F.2d at 870.
31 See id. at 865.
1, Id. at 884.
31 See text accompanying notes 7-11 supra. In Postal, the Fifth Circuit first determined
that the Coast Guard had breached the Convention, and then evaluated the effect of that
breach on domestic law. 589 F.2d at 873. Had the court found that the Coast Guard's actions
did not constitute a breach of the Convention, it would not have reached the question whether
the treaty was self-executing. See 589 F.2d at 868.
3 589 F.2d at 877.
' Id. at 877-78; see text accompanying notes 46-49 infra.
' See 589 F.2d at 877-78.
3 589 F.2d at 878-83; see text accompanying notes 51-62 infra.
1980]
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over aliens apprehended beyond its territorial limits.38
The court noted several examples of long-standing United States policy
extending both federal law and the jurisdiction of federal courts beyond
territorial limits when persons outside those limits threaten to violate
United States law or endanger domestic interests. 9 The court indicated
that defendants could only overcome the compelling interest in domestic
security, apparent from records of Senate hearings on the Convention, by
a strong showing of legislative intent to supercede existing federal statutes
by implementing Article 6 as enforceable United States law."0 According
to the court, the hearings not only failed to show Senate intent to limit
United States jurisdiction, t but clearly demonstrated that the Senate did
not intend to depart from existing domestic law. 2 Finding that the Con-
vention had not been executed and was not self-executing, the Fifth Cir-
cuit rejected defendants' claim that their illegal arrest precluded exercise
of personal jurisdiction over them by United States courts.
43
The Postal court briefly noted that Article 6 appeared to be self-
executing on its face, but did not further construe the language of the
Convention." The language of the Convention provides no basis for a posi-
tive conclusion that the treaty is either self-executing or non-self-
executing."5 While the Convention articulates broad principles to promote
freedom of the seas, it fails to specify any means of enforcement orsanc-
tions for violations of its terms." Several articles are expressly non-self-
executing, requiring individual states to draft regulations to enforce their
provisions. 7 However, since a treaty often includes both self-executing and
589 F.2d at 878-83; see text accompanying notes 51-62 infra.
' 589 F.2d at 879-81. The United States has long subscribed to the "protective principle"
which gives a nation jurisdiction to enact laws attaching criminal consequences to extraterri-
torial acts which threaten its domestic security. See Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 599
(1927); Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975,
981 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Parks v. United States, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); Rivard v.
United States, 375 F.2d 882, 886 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Groleau v. United States,
389 U.S. 884 (1967); RESTATEMENT OF FoREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 21, § 33(1). Courts also
refer to the protective principle as the "objective view of the territorial principle of jurisdic-
tion," or jurisdiction which reaches all acts which take effect within the sovereign although
the actor is elsewhere. See, e.g., United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1257 (5th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Keller, 451 F. Supp. 631, 635 (D.P.R. 1978). Application of the protective
principle requires that the relative weights of domestic and international concerns be bal-
anced to determine whether the interest of the United States in prosecution of the domestic
criminal charge, or the world interest in state sovereignty, is more compelling. See United
States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258, 1265-66 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d
862, 871 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Williams, 589 F.2d 210, 213 (5th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1257 (5th Cir. 1978).
" 589 F.2d at 881, 884.
" Id. at 881-82.
42 Id. at 879, 882-84; see text accompanying notes 51-62 infra.
'3 See 589 F.2d at 884.
< Id. at 877.
"5 See generally Convention on the High Seas, supra note 3.
'1 See, e.g., Convention on the High Seas, supra note 3, arts. 6, 22, 23.
,1 See, e.g., id. arts. 24, 25, 27-29. These provisions deal with pollution of the seas and
[Vol. XXXVII
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non-self-executing articles, the, Convention's non-self-executing articles
are not determinative of the construction of the whole treaty. 8
A self-executing treaty or alticle becomes binding domestic law in every
ratifying nation." None of the Convention's individual articles state that
they will become binding law without legislative implementation. Nor does
a single article make self-executing all provisions in which the drafters
expressed no intent. On its face, therefore, the Convention is ambiguous
regarding self-execution.
In Postal, the Fifth Circuit relied heavily on legislative intent to resolve
the ambiguity inherent in the Convention." The Postal court noted that
as early as 1790 the United States had .asserted authority to board and
search foreign ships outside its territorial waters." For nearly 200 years the
United States has enacted laws reaching beyond its territorial limits to
protect compelling domestic interests," and has established sanctions for
violations of those laws.5 3 The Anti-Smuggling Act of 193514 authorized the
President to designate a temporary "customs enforcement zone" extending
up to sixty-two miles from the coast, within which the Coast Guard could
board and inspect suspicious vessels."
If the Convention were construed as self-executing, Article 6 would
unconditionally prohibit seizure or arrest of aliens threatening a coastal
nation's domestic security by that coastal state, unless specifically author-
ized by another international treaty." The Fifth Circuit therefore reasoned
the installation of cables and pipelines on the ocean floor. See id.
" Self-Executing Treaties, supra note 9, at 773 n.6.
' See note 7 supra. In all nations which recognize a distinction between self-executing
and non-self-executing treaties an expressly self-executing treaty will automatically become
domestic law upon ratification. Id. However, even a treaty which specifically provides for self-
execution cannot become enforceable law in a state which does not recognize the concept of
self-execution, in the absence of legislative implementation. See 589 F.2d at 878; Self-
Executing Treaties, supra note 9, at 773-75.
" See 589 F.2d at 878-84; text accompanying note 10 supra; text accompanying notes
57-61 infra.
" 589 F.2d at 879. n 1790, Congress passed legislation enabling the Coast Guard to board
foreign ships beyond the three-mile limit of the territorial sea, in order to collect taxes
imposed by federal statutes. 1 Stat. 145 (1790). The Supreme Court sustained the statute,
holding that the United States was competent to compel compliance with its laws beyond
the territorial sea in order to protect domestic interests and ensure domestic security. Church
v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. 187 (1804).
"2 See 589 F.2d at 879, 885. Current narcotics control legislation is based on a congres-
sional finding that a great part of the traffic in controlled substances moves through interstate
and foreign commerce. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801(3) (1976). The commerce
clause of the United States Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate commerce
between the United States and foreign nations. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
0 See, e.g., note 29 supra.
51 19 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1711 (1976). The Anti-Smuggling Act of 1935 imposes criminal
penalties for illegal importation of liquor. See id. The Act is founded on the Church v.
Hubbart doctrine of extraterritorial jurisdiction. United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d at 880; see
Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. 187, 233-35 (1804); note 51 supra.
19 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (1976).
See 589 F.2d at 878.
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that the Convention's drafters and the Senate would have given considera-
bly more attention and debate to Article 6 had it been intended to be self-
executing. 7 In the absence of either an express provision for self-execution
or strong extrinsic evidence of Senate intent, the court declined to hold
that the Senate meant summarily to reverse the United States' settled
principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction.58 The court's conclusion is sound,
since a self-executing reading of Article 6 would be entirely inconsistent
with existing legislative policy."
Legislative history of the Convention indicates that the United States
intended to adhere to its traditionally broad assumption of jurisdiction. In
Postal, the Fifth Circuit quoted testimony before the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations stating that the Convention did not contain provi-
sions which would supercede domestic legislation." In addition, a repre-
sentative of the State Department testified before the Committee that new
implementing legislation might be "necessary or desirable."'" The Postal
court found that these statements weighed in favor of a non-self-executing
reading of Article 6.62
The Fifth Circuit's holding that Article 6 is not self-executing enables
the United States to enforce domestic law against aliens arrested on the
high seas, although a court which assumes jurisdiction may have to rule
on a treaty based claim. 3 The International Court of Justice is the judicial
5 589 F.2d at 878.
"Id. at 884.
" See note 29 supra. Congress has enacted federal statutes creating strict registration
requirements for distributors of controlled substances (21 U.S.C. §§ 821-829 (1976)), prohibit-
ing unlicensed manufacture or distribution of controlled substances (21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 952
(1976)), and establishing sanctions for violation of, or conspiracy to violate any statute regu-
lating controlled substances (21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 963 (1976)). By definition, the process of
importation begins in another country, indicating that Congress intended the statutes to be
operative beyond United States territorial limits. United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252,
1259 (5th Cir. 1978).
11 589 F.2d at 881. Mr. Arthur Dean, Chairman of the United States Delegation to the
1958 Law of the Sea Conference, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that
the Conventions on the Law of the Sea contained no provisions which would override domestic
legislation. SENATE HEARINGS, supra note 16, at 75, reprinted in 106 CONG. REc. 11191 (1960).
" 589 F.2d at 881-82. A statement of self-executing intent by the State Department may
be conclusive evidence on the question whether a particular treaty operates as domestic law
immediately upon ratification. See Criteria for Self-Executing Treaties, supra note 6, at 243.
Conversely, the Fifth Circuit found that the absence of a State Department statement indi-
cated that the treaty should be construed as non-self-executing. 589 F.2d at 881-82.
62 589 F.2d at 882.
" Since Article 6 is not self-executing and has not been legislatively implemented, it is
not a part of domestic law. See text accompanying notes 7-8 supra. United States courts are
not competent to enforce Article 6 because they have no guidelines to determine whether a
violation has taken place. See, e.g., Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir. 1976); Saipan v. United States Dep't of Interior,
502 F.2d 90, 101 (9th Cir. 1974), (Trask, J., concurring); Self-Executing Treaties, supra note
8, at 774. Thus, where defendants allege a violation of Article 6, a United States court can
decline to exercise jurisdiction over the treaty-based defense while deciding the domestic
question. See United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d at 884-91.
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branch of the United Nations," and has jurisdiction to decide all questions
of international law which are properly before it." The Optional Protocol
submitted to the Senate with the Convention provided that the Interna-
tional Court would have compulsory jurisdiction over all disputes involving
interpretation or application of the Convention." Thus, the Optional Pro-
tocol mandated that every ratifying state relinquish jurisdiction over all
cases inw which a party pleaded a claim or defense based on the Conven-
tion."7 The Convention's drafters intended that the Optional Protocol
would designate the International Court as the single judicial forum for
resolving disputes founded on the treaty.
The Senate did not agree, however, that the International Court should
have sole jurisdiction to decide treaty questions. Even though the United
States formally declared its acceptance of the International Court's juris-
diction in 1946,8 an amendment introduced by Senator Thomas Connally
reserved to the United States the right to determine whether a treaty
," U.N. CHARTER art. 92; STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 1. The
Court is composed of elected judges. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTIcE art. 2.
No two of its fifteen members are nationals of the same state. Id. art. 3, 1.
" STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JusTIcE art. 36, 1. Only a sovereign state may
bring an action in the International Court. Id. art. 34, 1. A private citizen has no standing to
sue in the International Court alleging a treaty violation since his rights under the treaty are
derived from those of a party state. United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258, 1268 (5th Cir.
1979). In Conroy, the government of Haiti consented to the Coast Guard's boarding, search
and seizure of a Haitian ship in Haitian waters. Id. at 1263. The search disclosed 7,000 pounds
of marijuana. Id. The Fifth Circuit held that the individual defendants lacked standing to
assert the improper seizure as a defense, where the offended sovereign refused to protest. Id.
at 1268.
1 Optional Protocol, supra note 13, art. 1. But see note 15 supra. Only a nation that has
ratified the Optional Protocol has standing to require the International Court to assume
jurisdiction over an aggrieved citizen's Convention-based claim or defense. Optional Protocol,
supra note 13, art. 1; see United States v. Williams, 589 F.2d 210, 212 n.1 (5th Cir. 1979).
The foreign ship in Postal was registered in the United Kingdom and its crew claimed
Australian citizenship. 589 F.2d at 866. Both the United Kingdom and Australia have ratified
the Convention and the Optional Protocol. See Department of State, Treaties in Force (1979);
589 F.2d at 868 n.8. Although either state could have sued in the International Court alleging
a violation of the Convention, neither chose to do so. Since the individual defendants could
not bring an action in the Court, and Convention was not enforceable law in the United
States, the defendants were without a judicial forum competent to hear and rule on their
treaty defense. See notes 65-66 supra.
,7 106 CONG. REc. 11193 (1960) (remarks of Sen. Russell Long). When the Optional
Protocol came before the Senate for ratification, Senator Long expressed concern that its
ratification would deprive the United States of the ability to decide questions of domestic
law. Id. at 11193, 11195-96. Some weeks after the Senate's initial consideration and rejection
of the Optional Protocol, Senator Long submitted to the Senate a reservation to the Protocol.
106 CONG. Rc. 15748 (1960). The proposed amendment reserved to the United States the
power to decide that a particular matter was essentially a domestic question, and thus
properly within domestic jurisdiction rather than that of the International Court. Id. The
Optional Protocol and accompanying reservation have never been reconsidered by the Senate.
," 61 Stat. 1218 (1946). President Truman signed a declaration acknowledging the Inter-
national Court's compulsory jurisdiction in disputes concerning interpretation of a treaty and
questions of international law, on behalf of the United States. Id.
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dispute concerned a domestic matter and, if so, to exercise jurisdiction over
both the domestic question and the treaty dispute.A9 The Optional Protocol
is clearly inconsistent with the Connally Amendment. The United States
did not ratify the Optional Protocol, however, and thus did not deprive
federal courts of the ability to exercise jurisdiction where defendants allege
a violation of the Convention."
The United State presently has a compelling interest in controlling the
ever increasing supply of narcotics smuggled into its territories. Histori-
cally the United States has subscribed to the principle of freedom of the
seas enunciated in the Convention." However, the treaty promotes free-
dom of the seas only to the extent that the exercise of that privilege does
not infringe upon the sovereignty of any individual state.72 A foreign ship
carrying a cargo of narcotics, which lies on the high seas adjacent to a
coastal nation, abuses the rights and privileges conferred by the Conven-
tion. It is unlikely that the Convention's drafters or its signatories contem-
plated that Article 6 would enable the crew of such a vessel to claim
automatic immunity from prosecution.73
11 See id.; 106 CONG. REC. 11193, 11195-96 (1960). The amendment is known as the
Connally Reservation. Id. The United States will therefore assume jurisdiction over any
dispute in which domestic considerations outweigh international concerns. Id.
" See 106 CONG. REc. 11193 (1960). Ostensibly, the Optional Protocol failed because less
than two-thirds of the Senators were present when the Senate voted to ratify. Id. at 11193. A
newspaper article published soon after the vote suggested that those senators who were not
present for the vote may have sought to thwart the Protocol without affirmatively voting
against it. Moley, Executive Bypass of the Connally Amendment Perils US. Interests, Los
Angeles Times, June 24, 1960, at 5, col. 1; reprinted in 106 CONG. REC. 15749 (1960). Since
President Eisenhower sought to introduce the four conventions and the Optional Protocol for
simultaneous ratification, see 105 CONG. REc. 18673 (1959) (message from the President),
many senators may not have realized the conflict between the Protocol and the Connally
Reservation prior to Senator Long's comments. Id.; see text accompanying note 60 supra.
1' See 106 CONG. REc. 11191 (1960). Self-interest motivates a coastal nation to protect
its vessels and its territory from harmful or threatening foreign intrusion. United States v.
The Winds Will, 405 F. Supp. 879, 882 (S.D. Fla. 1975). Ideally, every nation's desire to
maintain internal security will encourage it to supervise and control its own vessels. Id.
However, the drug smuggler's home state may lack the receiving nation's direct interest in
preventing drug traffic. Policing measures by the receiving nation may therefore be the only
effective means of controlling international shipment of controlled substances. See Church
v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. 187, 233-35 (1804); United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1263-64 (5th
Cir. 1978).
12 The Convention does not create an absolute right to non-interference on the high seas.
See notes 19-20 supra. The Convention's drafters sought both to promote freedom of the seas
and to protect national sovereignty. See notes 18-20 supra.
" A rule that a coastal nation cannot seize a ship known or believed to be transporting
controlled substances for importation into its territory, merely because the vessel lies outside
territorial waters, thwarts the nation's ability to control drug traffic effectively. See text
accompanying note 71 supra. When a coastal nation arrests alien drug smugglers it furthers
the international interest in controlling the availability and use of narcotic drugs. See
generally Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 30, 1961, Preamble [1967] 18 U.S.T.
1409, T.I.A.S. No. 6298, 520 U.N.T.S. 204; note 52 supra. Arrest of foreign drug smugglers in
international waters and their prosecution under the laws of the arresting coastal nation, does
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The language of the Convention on the High Seas, its legislative his-
tory, and the Senate's refusal to ratify the Optional Protocol, indicate that
the treaty did not become enforceable domestic law upon ratification.
Thus, the Fifth Circuit has properly found that the Convention is non-self
executing.74 Since the treaty has not been legislatively implemented into
domestic law, the United States has imposed no binding territorial limita-
tions upon its jurisdiction. 5 The long-standing domestic principle that
defendailts may not defeat a court's jurisdiction by asserting an unlawful
arrest therefore continues to govern aliens apprehended by the United
States on the high seas.7
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not necessarily injure the sovereign interests of their home state. See, e.g., United States v.
Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 879 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1260-61
(5th Cir. 1978).
7' United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d at 884. See text accompanying notes 51-62 supra.
7 See notes 7-9 supra, and accompanying text.
7' See notes 5-6 supra, and accompanying text.

